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After the Civil War the United States entered the age of the machine, not only in 
the realm of industry, but in politics as well.  The two major parties developed elaborate 
organizations, their ideological commitments diminished, and they became more 
thoroughly entrenched in power.  These developments were especially evident in cities, 
where professional politicians mobilized working-class and immigrant voters to create 
formidable party operations.  Reformers labeled these organizations ￿machines,￿ a 
derisive metaphor that evoked a broad set of meanings in an age of rapid 
industrialization.   Exploring the origins and use of that term can help us understand a 
broader shift in the prevailing conception of how American democracy worked. 
The significance of the rise of the machine metaphor becomes clear when we 
compare it to its predecessor.  During the late 1860s and early 1870s, as the Civil-War-
era ideological commitments of the two major parties faded and as a series of scandals 
erupted, reformers initially expressed their concern over the corrupting force of ￿rings.￿  
That term suggested an explanation of political corruption consistent with a traditional 
republican framework pitting selfish interests against the public good.  ￿Machine￿ 
implied a more complex, powerful, and permanent entity.  It invited more systematic 
explanations of the sources and character of political institutions and processes, an 
impulse consistent with the rising cultural authority of social scientific analysis.   2
The shift from ring to machine signaled a changing explanation of political 
corruption, one with ironic consequences.  The republican fear of faction and the 
concomitant emphasis on moral consensus that lay at the heart of the pre-Civil War 
antiparty and reform rhetoric proved inadequate for explaining the sources and possible 
remedies for the dishonesty and fraud evident in postwar politics.   A new critique fed by 
Darwinian social science arose during the 1870s and 1880s.  It presented the corrupt 
party politics of the Gilded Age as a product of social evolution and linked this style of 
politics to the working class and to specific racial groups.  Although it rejected the 
validity of these alternative forms of group based politics, this new critique implicitly 
acknowledged the multiple sources of political morality active in American public life￿
inadvertantly furthering the perception of a plural society upon which machine politics 
rested. 
The chief authors of this new analysis were the liberal reformers we remember as 
￿mugwumps.￿  Mugwump was the derisive term coined to describe a small set of wealthy 
Republicans whose dissatisfaction with party politics intensified during the 1870s and 
1880s and culminated in their endorsement of Democratic presidential candidate Grover 
Cleveland in 1884.  Spoilsman James Blaine dismissed them as ￿noisy but not 
numerous,￿ a judgment echoed by several generations of historians.  But recent research 
has suggested that the noise they made in the pages of magazines and newspapers and in 
various lobbying efforts mattered.  This diverse body of scholarship portrays mugwumps 
as a well-positioned interest group that helped shape modern American political culture.
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It has returned liberal reformers, if not to center stage, then to a place of importance in 
the political history of Gilded Age America.   3
Though a welcome corrective, recent work on Mugwumps would benefit from a 
stronger sense of irony.  In the arena of political reform, their rhetoric and ideas 
generated unexpected results.  By developing the image of the political machine and 
offering a social rather than simply a moral explanation how it worked, liberal reformers 
unintentionally gave credence to the idea that politics was a clash of groups rather than 
the high-minded pursuit of the public good.  As Mugwumps acknowledged this change 
and acted upon it, they unintentionally fueled a redefinition of American politics that 
made the machine idea more palatable.  Tracing the evolution of Gilded Age political 
reform rhetoric sheds light on how they did so.  
 
When Americans spoke of political corruption during the era of Reconstruction, 
they most often spoke of rings. Every scandal seemed to have a ring behind it:  the 
Whiskey Ring, the Erie Ring, the Customs House Ring, and the Washington Ring were 
but examples of a pervasive conspiratorial greed and dishonesty that critics feared was 
undermining American democracy.  Complaints of ring rule arose in many urban settings 
as well.  Reformers in New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and other cities warned of 
cliques threatening the civic health of their communities, the most infamous of them New 
York￿s Tweed Ring.
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   The choice of words was significant. ￿Ring￿ located the source of political 
corruption in the dishonesty and wrongdoing of a small, semisecret circle of men.  Rings 
were not complex party organizations but rather ￿knots￿ of men who manipulated the 
political process to enrich themselves.  ￿A ￿ring￿ is, in its common form,￿ explained the 
Nation, ￿a small number of persons who get possession of an administrative machine and   4
distribute the offices or other good things connected with it among a band of fellows, of 
greater or less dimensions, who agree to divide them whatever they take.￿  That the word 
could be used to describe criminals with no connection to politics underscored its 
political meaning.  It evoked a conspiracy to rob the public, a word roughly 
interchangeable with clique or gang, and it explained corruption as an outgrowth of moral 
failure, the product of greed. 
3  
  In offering a moral explanation of political wrongdoing, critics of ￿rings￿ created 
an image that fit comfortably within the rhetorical framework of republicanism.  
Republicanism￿s concern for civic virtue￿distinterested service to the common good￿
and its definition of corruption as the selfish pursuit of power and wealth at the expense 
of the common weal remained a staple of the American reform vocabulary long after the 
visions of an agrarian republic that shaped it had faded.  Attacks against ￿rings￿ 
portrayed political wrongdoing in similar terms, as the work of grasping politicos with no 
concern for the well being of the public.  ￿The general good alone had no voice, for it had 
no ring,￿ Henry Adams complained in an 1869 lament that summed up the tension 
between the selfish politics of the day and traditional concern for civic virtue.  The term 
broke with classical republicanism￿s emphasis on the selfish pursuit of power, stressing 
instead the perpetrators￿ lust for wealth.  But it continued to pit individual selfishness 
against the common good in its explanation of corruption. 
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  Not surprisingly, alarm about ￿ring rule￿ was particularly acute in cities. Urban 
heterogeneity directly challenged and ultimately undercut republican notions of 
consensual politics.  In New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, Buffalo, Chicago, 
Boston and other large urban settings, party politics grew increasingly group-oriented and   5
conflict-ridden.  Big-city politicians such as William M. Tweed and his Tammany 
predecessor Fernando Wood or Philadelphia Republicans James McManes and William 
Stokely were not gentlemen commanding deference but skilled manipulators of popular 
passions and interests.  In attempting to describe this new politics and mobilize popular 
opposition to it, reformers offered an indictment built upon visions of individual moral 
culpability.  In the setting where the traditional ideals of republican politics were most at 
risk, the term ring was particularly resonant. 
  New York City￿s Tweed Ring was the quintessential urban ring.  William Magear 
Tweed, Richard Connolly, Peter Barr Sweeny and Mayor Abraham Oakey Hall, working 
with a handful of supporters, constituted the ring.  Though often described as the first 
urban political machine, Tweed and his confederates are better seen as a faction within 
the Democratic Party.  They controlled Tammany Hall, one of several organizations 
vying for power within New York City￿s Democracy.  From 1866 to 1871, Tammany 
dominated the local party, giving the Tweed Ring control of city government and a fair 
amount influence at the state level.  During their time in power all four ring members 
grew rich from the kickbacks and bribes that flowed their way.   By one estimate they 
stole $6,312,541.37 from the city in 1870 alone. A series of exposes by the New York 
Times in July 1871 documenting the Ring￿s massive fraud triggered an anti-Tammany 
crusade that ultimately removed Tweed and his confederates from power.
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  A close examination of the representations used during the anti-Tweed campaign 
reveals the republican framework embedded in indictments of ￿ rings.￿  Coverage in the 
Times, which spearheaded the opposition, depicted the scandal as a case of individual 
wrongdoing by a handful of men, a theme echoed by other New York newspapers.    6
Harper￿s Weekly cartoonist Thomas Nast brought the Ring to national attention through 
his art, depicting ring members in similar terms and pitting them against a united public.  
   The dominant motif in the Times￿ coverage was criminality.  The paper peppered 
its coverage with references to theft and fraud. When Tweed and his allies insisted on 
their innocence prior to the most damning revelations and demanded proof, the Times 
compared them to ￿a gang of burglars.￿  In the midst of the most powerful revelations, 
the paper charged that the ￿Tammany gang￿ was guilty of  ￿robbing the public in a more 
audacious manner than ever.￿  The Ring had undertaken ￿the gigantic robbery of the 
city;￿ its members were ￿municipal thieves￿ who had conducted ￿schemes of plunder,￿ 
￿frauds,￿ and ￿swindles.￿  Denying it had political motives, the paper insisted of Mayor 
Hall, ￿we call him a thief because we can prove him to be one.￿  Even Tammany￿s 
supporters came largely from the ranks of the city￿s ￿most inveterate criminals, roughs, 
[and] thieves￿ What the paper presented to its readers was a case of theft in which the 
victim was the city or ￿the public￿ and the perpetrators were a specific group of 
individuals.
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Such a critique also echoed the traditional republican fear of faction.  In several 
instances the Times specifically labeled the Ring a ￿corrupt faction.￿  Like the placeman 
their eighteenth-century forebears feared, the paper saw the Tweed Ring engaged in a 
￿conspiracy against the public￿ which had to be checked through the consensual action of 
the entire community.  When the Ring was defeated at the polls in November, it exulted 
that ￿the voice of the people is supreme￿ and that while their moral principles ￿may be 
momentarily stifled by dishonest factions,￿ they would ultimately triumph.  The Times￿ 
analysis was not simply the application of an inherited ideology.  It stressed greed as the   7
Ring￿s motivation, a departure from classical republicanism￿s concern about the 
accumulation of power in the hands of a few men.  But republican rhetoric remained the 
dominant vocabulary of political reform.
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  In the infrequent instances when the Times moved beyond its emphasis on 
individual culpability to offer social explanations of the Ring￿s power it did so obliquely.   
The paper￿s obsession with the criminality of Tweed and his allies also had class 
implications, placing them outside the bounds of middle-class respectability.  It 
occasionally noted the class origins of the Ring￿s support as well, which it claimed came 
from the ￿lowest dregs of our population.￿  And the Times made periodic references to 
the need for ￿taxpayers￿￿which meant property holders at a time when assessment of 
real estate was the primary form of taxation￿to organize against the Ring.  The violence 
and upheaval of the Paris Commune also lurked in the background.  Although the event 
occurred during the spring before the Tweed scandal broke, the coverage of it in 
American magazines and newspapers persisted into the summer and the Times implied 
that ring rule might unleash similar forces in New York.
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Ethnicity sporadically entered the paper￿s analysis of the Ring￿s power as well.  
Of particular significance among Ring backers were ignorant immigrants, most notably 
the  ￿Irish rabble￿ who had poured into the city over the previous three decades.  The 
Ring￿s failure to contain the ￿Orange Riot,￿ a clash between Irish Catholics and Irish 
Protestants on July 12
th, led some to attack it as a tool of Irish Catholic interests just as 
the Times accelerated its offensive against the Ring.  Although the paper insisted 
respectable Irish did not support the Ring, the context of its commentary, and its attacks 
on Tweed and Mayor Hall for supporting the Irish rioters framed the discussion of the   8
political situation.  It also published a special supplemental edition of the paper 
summarizing its Tweed investigation in both English and German, another tacit 
acknowledgement of the plural character of its audience. But discussions of the voters 
who put the Ring in power were uncommon and neither class- nor ethnically driven 
interpretations of the scandal were explored in depth in the paper￿s revelations.  The 
emphasis remained on the thefts themselves and the culpability of a handful of men, a 
depiction consistent with republican explanations of corruption rooted in the dishonesty 
of Tammany leaders and a lack of civic virtue among the people as a whole.
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  As the Times￿ sporadic stabs at social analysis suggest, the republican-tinged 
vision of a handful of selfish men grabbing power and wealth at the expense of the 
common good was difficult to sustain.  The paper was conscious of the class and ethnic 
dimensions of the Ring￿s support, but it lacked the language necessary to interpret the 
scandal in social terms.  Explaining the origins and power of the Tweed Ring as a product 
of class or ethnic differences was not possible because to do so required abandoning the 
rhetorical ideal of a consensual body politic.  That ingrained vision, a republican 
inheritance, remained a powerful force shaping the paper￿s understanding of what Tweed 
and his partners had done and how they would be defeated.
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 The  Times￿ exposes brought the Tweed Ring national attention, but it was the art 
of Thomas Nast that had the widest and most enduring impact.  The cartoonist for 
Harper￿s Weekly, the preeminent middle-class magazine of the age, Nast￿s scathing 
caricatures of Tweed and his allies remain among the most famous and powerful 
examples of political cartooning in American history.  Long critical of Democratic rule in 
New York City, Nast seized on the Times￿ revelations as the basis for a series of   9
devastating cartoons that played a central role in defeating the Ring.  The Nation noted 
that it was ￿hardly possible to award too much praise￿ to Nast for his anti-Tammany 
work, which ￿brought the rascalities of the Ring home to hundreds of thousands who 
never would have looked at the figures and printed denunciations.￿  Nast not only helped 
destroy the Ring, his caricatures of Tweed carved a place for themselves in the American 
political imagination as the classic image of the urban party boss.
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  Like the Times, Nast conceived of the Tweed scandal within a framework of 
republican ideology.  His most famous Tweed cartoon, ￿The Tammany Tiger Loose￿ 
[fig. 1] used a Christians and Lions motif to depict a ferocious beast attacking the 
prostrate feminine image of the Republic, with a shattered ballot box and a broken sword 
lying nearby.  Tweed and his henchmen looked on from the emperor￿s box, underscoring 
the illegitimate and undemocratic nature of their power. After the defeat of the Ring in 
November, 1871 Tweed marked the triumph with a similar image of the Republic, shield 
in hand, triumphantly displaying a ballot box that had crushed Tweed, Hall, and Sweeny 
[Fig 2].  Broadsides announced ￿Victory for the Republic￿ and ￿Down with Corruption￿ 
while images of the Pope and other aristocratic European leaders looked on, surprised 
and dismayed.  In both cartoons the Tweed issue was presented as a clash between the 
corrupt, monarchical tendencies of the Ring￿s leaders and the Republic￿a singular entity 
that represented the interests of people as a whole.   
Although Nast emphasized the disreputability of ring members, the class 
implications of his cartoons were muted.  Tweed, Sweeny, Connolly, and Hall were 
distinctive characters in his art, not archetypes representing specific social classes, and 
the predatory actions of the Ring were the work of individuals.  When he juxtaposed the    10
 
Ring￿s avarice with the plight of working-class rent payers, he echoed the defensive 
claims of the speechmakers at the opening meeting of the Committee of Seventy, who 
insisted that the movement against the Ring had the backing of both rich and poor. 
Workmen are portrayed sympathetically, with upright stature and respectable dress (fig. 
3).  Only in rare instances did Nast betray fears of a working-class revolt.  In one anti-
Ring cartoon published before the Times revelations he linked the Ring to the Paris 
Commune, a connection he dropped from subsequent work.  Otherwise, his visual assault 
on the Ring pitted a united public against the corrupt actions of a specific set of greedy 
and corrupt men.
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The more powerful strain in Nast￿s art was racial.  He invariably depicted Irish 
immigrants in simian terms, a conventional device in mid-nineteenth-century Anglo-
American art.  Although such images dominated his cartoons about religious and 
educational issues, they were marginal to his indictment of Tweed and his allies.  Tweed  
Fig. 1 [Source:  J. 
Chal Vinson, Thomas 
Nast: Political 
Cartoonist (Athens: 
University of Georgia 
Press, 1967), Image 
52.]   11
 
was Scotch Presbyterian, but both Connolly and Sweeny were Irish.  Yet Nast caricatured 
them in individualized ways with no reference to Irish racial features.  In a few instances, 
ape-like Irish figures appear in Nast￿s anti-Tammany art, but they were rarely featured 
and more often were secondary elements in cartoons that emphasize the images of Tweed 
and the others.  His depictions of the working-class are clearly white [fig. 3].   The blame, 
in Nast￿s presentation, rested primarily with the handful of men who constituted the Ring 
rather than a particular class or group of people. 
Lacking the ideological arsenal necessary for a social analysis, reformers and 
critics of the Ring saw Tammany rule and the 1871 scandal primarily through a 
republican lens.  The Ring, run by a handful of greedy, dishonest men, had seized power  
Fig. 2 [Source: Morton 
Keller, The Art and Politics
of Thomas Nast (New 
York: Oxford University 
Press, 1968), Image 129, p. 
204.]   12
 
and threatened republican government.  Its opponents presented their effort as collective 
and consensual and called Tammany￿s defeat the triumph of the people.  But the 
campaign against the Tweed Ring would be the last hurrah for this vision of urban 
politics.  By the mid 1870s, the term ring was declining in use and significance.  The 
image of a small clique conspiring to undermine the public good for selfish ends was not 
an effective symbol for the complex organizational politics that had taken root by the end 
of Reconstruction.   The word never entirely disappeared from the American political 
lexicon.  But the less ideological political style that had taken shape both nationally and 
in cities by the late 1870s demanded a new term, one suited to the increasing complexity 
and power of party organizations.  
 
The rise of the term machine as a dominant metaphor for American party 
organizations￿particularly those in urban settings￿signaled a shift in thinking about the 
sources and character of political corruption. By the late 1870s, critics of the major 
Fig. 3 [Source: 
Keller, Art and Politics
of Thomas Nast, 197, 
Image 121]   13
parties routinely referred to ￿machine politicians￿ and wrote increasingly of the need to 
curtail the power of ￿political machines.￿  In an age of rapid industrialization, the image 
of the machine was especially evocative, summoning forth images of power, efficiency, 
and the mindless obedience of working-class voters to the demands of the boss.   Its 
complexity encouraged analyses of political corruption that went well beyond the 
suggestion of criminality embedded in attacks on rings.  The class implications of the 
term also fueled social explanations of political behavior that ultimately linked the 
organizational style of politics to specific classes and racial groups and helped Americans  
reimagine politics as social conflict. 
  It is hardly surprising that the machine should become a metaphor for Gilded Age 
parties.  One of the major cultural processes of the nineteenth century was the response of 
Americans to the increasing presence of machinery in their daily lives, in the form of 
factory work, streetcars, and mass produced goods.  Machines quickly developed into a 
complex and highly contested symbol through which both Americans and Europeans 
expressed a range of responses to rapid industrialization.  Political reformers found it an 
evocative image that enabled them to say several things about the character of American 
politics during the Gilded Age. 
  Throughout the nineteenth century writers and artists used images of machines to 
represent an intrusive force that was destroying a bucolic, agrarian world.  The ￿machine 
in the garden￿ motif evoked a range of unsettling cultural changes associated with rapid 
industrialization.  Locomotives disrupting peaceful pastoral settings, steamships invading 
the pristine wilderness, and other images of machinery disturbing and ultimately 
destroying settings characterized by natural harmony and beauty became stock themes in   14
literature and painting in nineteenth-century America.  Thus when political reformers 
began to depict party organizations as machines, they employed an image that already 
represented a corrosive force capable of annihilating previously pure environments.
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  Changes in work fueled by industrialization created another politically potent set 
of meanings associated with machines.  Commentators in England and the United States 
sharply attacked the social and moral impact of factory work on laborers.  Thomas 
Carlyle, perhaps the most significant of the English anti-machine figures, warned of men 
growing ￿mechanical in head and heart.￿  While such laments referred most directly to 
the condition of labor, they had political implications as well.  Carlyle￿s particular target 
was Utilitarianism, but he was also issuing a more general warning, in Leo Marx￿s words, 
against ￿an excessive emphasis upon means as against ends, a preoccupation with the 
external arrangement of human affairs as against their inner meaning and consequences.￿  
In the United States, similar complaints could be found as early as the 1820s.  J.K. 
Paulding￿s ￿The Man-Machine; or, the Pupil of Circumstances￿ criticized the social and 
political consequences of the factory system, particularly the rigid, dehumanizing form of 
labor it imposed on workers.  William Henry Channing, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and 
Herman Melville issued similar criticisms during the 1840s and 1850s.  Such complaints 
connected machines with thoughtless routines, the antithesis of the engaged, independent-
minded citizenship necessary in a democracy.
14 
  Though these complaints did not carry the day in the United States, even 
defenders of machine-based production cast doubt on the intellectual capacity of the 
average worker.  Most Americans celebrated the rise of machinery as evidence of 
technical progress and the source of material abundance.  Defenders of the machine   15
recognized the changes in the nature of work wrought by industrialization but voiced 
approval for them.  Carroll Wright, appointed the first commissioner of the new federal 
Bureau of Labor in 1885, insisted that routinized factory work was a form of uplift, 
inducing discipline and improving morality among the otherwise slothful, dull-witted 
masses.  Others, most notably Frederick Winslow Taylor, made similar arguments.  At 
the base of many such claims was the Darwinian-fueled belief that the immigrants and 
rural migrants who constituted the bulk of the industrial labor force were inherently 
inferior.  ￿The majority of human minds are weak, and slow, and could do little in the 
world but for simple tasks adapted to small and barren brains,￿ wrote an advocate of 
mechanized production.  ￿Monotonous toil suits them exactly  . . .  . The exact and 
punctual habit, which the machine engenders, trains careless minds with a discipline most 
wholesome.￿  Though a defense of the impact of factory work, these arguments 
reinforced visions of the industrial workers who supported urban machines as incapable 
of meeting the standards necessary for democratic citizenship.
15 
  By the time political reformers began to use the machine metaphor, debates over 
the consequences of industrialization had invested it with a range of meanings that made 
it an effective term of political derision.  Not only did it evoke visions of a force that 
destroyed the purity of a virginal, harmonious America and corrupted workers, it 
symbolized power and permanence.  The massive Corliss Engine, displayed at the 
Centennial Exposition in Philadelphia, embodied the scale and power of industrial 
machinery, as did huge factories and powerful locomotives.  Whether a beneficial or 
detrimental force, machines were a significant cultural presence in the United States by 
the end of the century.  Labeling party organizations as machines ensured that they would   16
be seen as a force to be reckoned with, one fully capable of undermining American 
democracy and corrupting the American people. 
  Gilded Age reformers were not the first to speak of machines in a political sense.   
Eighteenth and early nineteenth-century politicians occasionally referred to 
government￿both its institutions and personnel￿as a machine.  The word had its origins 
in Enlightenment thought, used as Isaac Newton had used it to describe nature in 
mechanical terms, as a realm governed by a distinct and coherent set of natural laws.   
The political institutions of a particular society worked in a complex but consistent (and 
thus comprehensible) manner and politics was a science devoted to understanding the 
processes and people that defined them.  John Adams described the British constitution in 
1775 as a ￿great machine [that] will not go any longer without the new wheel￿ and 
Thomas Jefferson wrote of ￿the great machine of government.￿   As late as the Civil War 
era, Abraham Lincoln spoke of ￿running this machine￿ in reference to leading the 
national government.  The term was used in this fashion regularly to describe the U.S. 
Constitution during the nineteenth century￿James Russell Lowell famously declared it 
￿a machine that would go unto itself￿ in 1888￿but the Enlightenment usage faded as the 
twentieth century approached.
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  The decline of this morally neutral meaning roughly corresponded to the growth 
of a more derogatory understanding of the term, though there was a substantial period of 
coexistence and transition.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, critiques of machine 
politics began to seep into the popular idiom of politics.  The New York Tribune noted 
the existence of a ￿￿masheen￿ party￿ in the city￿s first ward￿the phonetic spelling hinted 
at the working-class Irish character of the organization￿in 1858.  Three years later a   17
reformer warned of the ￿modern and monstrous instrument known as the political party 
machine￿ that ￿crushes honesty and uprightness as effectually as the wheels of the 
Juggernaut does its victims.￿  Both uses of the word underscored its novelty￿as street 
slang and as a ￿modern￿ phenomenon in need of explanation.  As late as 1871, the label 
￿Tammany machine￿ appeared only a handful of times in discussions of the Tweed 
scandal.
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  By the late 1870s, the machine metaphor had become a regular element of the 
Mugwump vocabulary.   Their correspondence and public pronouncements routinely 
referred to ￿machines￿ and ￿machine politicians.￿   Definitions often accompanied early 
references in print.  It was not simply ￿organization,￿ but ￿the abuse of organization 
which is stigmatized as the ￿machine￿￿ declared R.R. Bowker.  H.V. Boynton described 
the machine as ￿the combinations inside politics￿ that blocked civic service reform.  Carl 
Schurz complained of a ￿kind of ￿machine politics￿ which consists in mere struggles for 
power and plunder.￿  The introduction of the term also generated a virtual cottage 
industry in which reformers sought to explain the origins and workings of the political 
machine.
18 
The attraction of the machine metaphor stemmed from its symbolic rather than its 
descriptive properties, although in some respects it was an appropriate term.  Party 
politics grew increasingly routinized and divorced from ideological considerations after 
the Civil War.  The complexity of party operations also increased dramatically during 
these years.  These developments were especially evident in cities, where party leaders 
forged increasingly elaborate organizations and the ￿machine￿ label became most closely 
associated with urban settings.  But the suggestion of power and efficiency evoked by the   18
machine image was not especially accurate, particularly in reference to city politics.  
With the possible exception of Pittsburgh, no major urban center featured a centralized 
party organization that held firm control of municipal government before the 1880s.  
Factional conflict within parties was far more common.  The machine metaphor 
suggested parties, especially urban parties, had established a level of power and 
efficiency that did not exist when the term first became popular.  It was the term￿s utility 
as a social label as well as its descriptive power that made it rhetorically attractive.
19 
  In an age of sharp labor conflict, the class implications of the machine metaphor 
proved especially powerful.  If party organizations were elaborate mechanisms, then the 
men who ran them were best imagined as skilled industrial workers.  Civil Service 
reformer George William Curtis compared party organization to a ￿locomotive￿ and 
labeled its leaders ￿drivers of the machine.￿  Englishman James Bryce, whose American 
Commonwealth was heavily influenced by his Mugwump informants, described 
politicians as operatives who had acquired ￿a familiarity with the wheels, shafts, and 
bands of the party machine, together with a skill in working it.￿  Fellow European visitor 
Moisie Ostorgorski, who also relied on liberal reformers in his investigation, described 
the ￿technical part￿ of American politics, which included developing ￿a knowledge of the 
machinery of party organization, with all its wheels within wheels.￿  In Solid for 
Mulhooly, Rufus Shapley￿s 1881 political satire, the title character learned, ￿after the 
manner of an apprentice,￿ how to operate ￿a political machine as complicated, as 
ingenious, as perfect as the works of a watch.￿  Much of this language flowed from the 
culture of urban party organization itself, which had long borrowed working-class 
terminology.  In adopting it and publicizing it, liberal reformers sharpened the image of   19
urban party politics as the province of the working class, albeit a particularly skillful 
segment of it.
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  Perhaps the fullest expression of this class implications of the machine metaphor 
appeared in an February 23, 1884 cartoon in Harper￿s Weekly (Fig 4).  ￿The Kelly 
Motor￿ portrayed then Tammany boss John Kelly operating a device labeled the ￿New 
York City Democracy.￿  Seated on a barrel of gin wearing overalls and a workmen￿s cap 
as the machine runs itself, Kelly reclines against the wall reading a newspaper.  The 
machine haphazardly spits out its products, political offices and contracts.  The image 
neatly captures the moral failing, corruption, and absence of principles that reformers 
believed characterized machine politics.  It also rendered Kelly, a wealthy politician who 
painstakingly cultivated an image of bourgeois respectability, as an indolent workingman 
lacking even the skill and talent implied in the images supplied Bryce and Ostorgorski. 
  The machine image also rendered voters insignificant.  The power supply for the 
Kelly Motor flows from a gin mill across the street, a reminder of the moral character of 
the voters who kept Tammany in power.  It is a disembodied image￿no specific voter 
appears in the cartoon.  Like the Harper￿s drawing, most presentations of machine 
politics focused on leaders.  Voters, if they appeared at all, were usually categorized as 
thoughtless dupes￿￿ignorant and pliable￿ in Bryce￿s words￿a description bolstered by 
the perception of immigrants as racially inferior. 
  Portraying machine politics and politicians in this manner fed a social explanation 
of the sources and character of urban party politics.  The complexity conveyed by the 
machine metaphor suggested that careful analysis￿not just moral condemnation￿was    20
 
required if reformers were to understand how American city politics worked.  Machines 
were not small bands of greedy adventurers who despoiled municipal government but 
sophisticated, powerful, and permanent political devices operated by a particular class of 
men who capitalized on the social and political circumstances of big-city life.  
Mechanical imagery underscored this claim, moving reform critiques away from 
republican-style attacks on selfish leaders and toward condemnations of party politicians 
in class terms.  Defining party leaders in this fashion, the rise of the machine metaphor 
helped open the way for explanations of political corruption that focused on groups rather 
than individuals.   
  At the core of this wider transformation was the rise of social science.  Many of 
the mugwumps whose writings would define machine politics were closely tied to the 
professionalization of the social sciences after the Civil War.  Influenced by Darwinism 
Fig. 4 [Source: 
Harper￿s Weekly, 
February 23, 1884]   21
and the profound cultural shift it wrought, they used scientific language to explain social 
phenomena, including politics. William Graham Sumner, popularizer of Social 
Darwinism in the United States, argued that American democracy was a ￿transient stage 
in social evolution￿ and urban machines and bosses were best understood in that context.  
The boss, he argued, was ￿the product of a long process of natural selection￿ and the 
￿natural outcome￿ of the evolution of American democratic institutions. Less neutrally, 
civil service activist Dorman Eaton saw the rise of Tammany as evidence of the 
￿degeneracy￿ of American urban democracy.  The New York City machine, he declared, 
was the product of haphazard political breeding, the ￿mongrel union . . . between a 
charity society and a partisan faction for office and spoils￿ that contained ￿conflicting 
elements of savagery and charity.￿
21  
  Darwinian rhetoric became a staple of political reform discourse over the final 
two decades of the nineteenth century.  In some cases politicians themselves were cast in 
these terms. Tammany Hall leader Richard Croker was a ￿prosimian bulk of bone and 
sinew￿a sort of human magetherium who has come crashing up from the swamps 
splashed with the slime of pre-Adamite wickedness.￿  Shapley￿s Mulhooly opened with 
an account of the title character￿s ￿Paddy-Cree￿ that laid heavy emphasis on his Irish 
origins.  More often, reformers stressed the racial character of the immigrant masses that 
backed the boss.  One reformer blamed municipal corruption on an influx of ￿illiterate 
peasants, freshly raked from Irish bogs￿Bohemian mines , or Italian robbers nests.￿ 
They were ￿beaten men from beaten races,￿ wrote another, lacking ￿the ideas and 
aptitudes which fit men to take up readily and easily the problem of self-care and self-  22
government, such as belong to those who are descended from the tribes that met under 
the oak trees of old Germany to make laws and choose chieftains.￿
22   
  The implications of this racialization are particularly evident in the work of two of 
the leading observers of late nineteenth-century American public life.  E.L. Godkin, the 
founding editor of the Nation and later editor of the New York Evening Post, was an 
advocate of civil service reform, an opponent of American imperialism, and a sharp critic 
of Gilded Age party politics.  A superb writer and an acute observer of American public 
life, he wielded an extraordinary sway over public opinion in middle- and upper-class 
reform circles.  William James remembered him as ￿the towering influence in all thought 
concerning public affairs￿ whose influence was ￿more persuasive than that of any other 
writer of the generation.￿  English aristocrat James Bryce produced the most important 
account of American political life since Tocqueville.  Published in 1888 and republished 
numerous times, the American Commonwealth remained the standard account of 
American politics for a generation.  Friends and colleagues, Godkin and Bryce advanced 
more extensive and systematic explanations of the shape and character of urban party 
politics than most of their contemporaries.
23 
  Although Godkin had written occasionally about urban public life before the 
1870s, the Tweed scandal prompted his first sustained commentary on the subject.  From 
the start he exhibited a distinctive analysis of the issue, one shared by a handful of 
commentators at the time.  While the Times, the Committee of Seventy, and Thomas 
Nast generally imagined the Tweed Ring in republican terms, as the conspiracy of a 
handful of men working against the public interest, Godkin attempted a more original   23
explanation of the ring, one that centered on the group sources of the scandal and 
ultimately proposed more radical responses.
24   
  For Godkin, Tweed￿s power was better explained through political and social 
analysis than simply as an example of individual moral turpitude.  The combination of 
universal suffrage and an influx of ill-bred, uneducated, and impoverished immigrants 
provided a mass of voters for profit-hungry ￿adventurers￿ to manipulate.  The 
excessively complex machinery of government provided offices and opportunities for 
these disreputable types to exploit and the lack of ￿civic spirit￿ on the part of respectable 
New Yorkers allowed them to do so.  Tweed￿s rise to power was ￿distinctly the result of 
a process of evolution,￿ Godkin explained in 1871.  Looking back in 1875 he noted that 
Tweed was ￿the product of a state of things which his overthrow would not 
fundamentally change￿he was a Boss because the condition of the voting population and 
the nature of governmental machinery made Bosses inevitable.￿  He was ￿an amazing 
villain,￿ Godkin concluded, ￿but nevertheless a legitimate outcome of his time.￿
25 
  Godkin located part of the problem in the class stratification of New York City.  
The industrial development of the city had drawn a large number of people ￿whose main 
interest in life is to make sure of their daily bread for one or two weeks ahead.￿ This 
created a substantial body of voters who were ￿ignorant and grossly corrupt.￿  It was the 
power of the vote held by this ￿lower stratum￿ that allowed Tweed and those like him to 
run the ￿elaborate machine￿ that was New York￿s government.  Only if ￿the industrious 
and intelligent classes￿ joined together to counter ￿the mere proletariat,￿ he argued, could 
sufficient reform be enacted to make municipal governance work.   Following this logic, 
Godkin ultimately sought to limit the franchise of the working class.  As a member of the   24
Tilden Commission, a state body charged with addressing the problem of urban political 
corruption, he advocated the creation of a separate Board of Audit elected by taxpayers 
only.  The proposition failed, but his support for it laid bare the class dimensions of his 
diagnosis of the Tweed Ring.
26 
  Racial and nativist assumptions also buttressed Godkin￿s class analysis, even 
before the Tweed scandal.  ￿We all know what the source of the evil is,￿ he declared in 
an 1866 discussion of municipal government:  ￿a swarm of foreigners have alighted, 
ignorant, credulous, newly emancipated, brutalized by oppression, and bred in the habit 
of regarding the law as their enemy.￿  This influx led directly to a decline in the quality 
of political leadership: ￿one of the results, and, perhaps, the worst, of this enormous 
addition of ignorant strangers to our voting population is that they have created a class of 
politicians formerly unknown.￿
27   
The Tweed revelations reinforced this point and Godkin￿s commentary made its 
Darwinian basis clear.  Noting the ￿fundamental evils￿underlying our city government,￿ 
he declared it ￿an incontrovertible fact that not only a large portion, but even a large 
majority of our population consists of foreigners, ignorant, unused to the exercise of the 
elective franchise, unendowed with the self-restraint and instinctive discrimination of 
men bred to the responsibilities of citizenship and self government.￿  These newcomers 
had been ￿trained￿to follow the leadership of the men whom we are trying to depose 
and keep deposed.￿  The Irish were the chief case in point.    In terms of  ￿political 
development,￿ he argued, the peasantry who made the bulk of mid-nineteenth-century 
Irish immigration were still in ￿the clan stage￿ and had not ￿passed through the same 
process of political and social development as the other races of Europe.￿  In 1866,   25
Godkin had expressed hope for the political assimilation of the Irish in ￿one or two 
generations.￿  The Tweed revelations destroyed that optimism, replacing it with an 
evolutionary perspective that permanently relegated immigrants to subordinate status.
28 
The presence of a large number of people lacking the intellectual and moral 
capacities for self-government bode ill for the prospects of democracy in urban America.  
In the Nation￿s commentary on the Tweed scandal, Godkin repeatedly stressed the 
importance of moral consensus in city politics.  ￿All successful municipal self-
government,￿ he wrote in 1871, ￿has been carried on by small, homogeneous 
communities, animated by a strong sense of fellowship and identity of interest.￿  In these 
settings, voters were ￿united by the closest of ties, those created by race, religion, and 
history￿ and ￿their numbers were sufficiently small to make municipal acquaintance 
possible and give tremendous force to public opinion.￿  In New York City, by contrast, 
￿the heterogeneous composition of the population￿ made ￿public opinion and public 
spirit weaker￿ and made Tweed possible.
29 
This frank acknowledgement of the heterogeneity at work in urban settings 
distinguished Godkin from his contemporaries during the early 1870s.  While others 
thundered against ￿rings￿ on behalf of the people, Godkin had largely abandoned the 
pretense of public unanimity.  He had come to the conclusion that machine politicians 
and the voters who supported them had their own political ethos, one at odds with the 
values of respectable citizens.  In part this difference was driven by class resentment.  Of 
the boss￿s ￿frauds and defalcations￿ working-class voters ￿care little or nothing,￿ he 
claimed, ￿and if they turn their minds to them at all, they look on them as legitmate 
fleecings of the rich.￿  But it had a racial basis as well.  The ￿foreign element￿ lacked   26
￿the Anglo-Saxon respect for forms and legal tradition,￿ he wrote privately in 1864, a 
sentiment he would broadcast regularly through the columns of the Nation in the wake of 
the Tweed controversy.  Immigrants, he later claimed, had a different mental and moral 
make up.  Produced by centuries of evolution, it rendered them unfit for citizenship in a 
democracy.
30  
Godkin continued to criticize Tammany and machine politics generally and his 
ideas powerfully influenced reformer￿s perceptions of machine rule.  Nowhere was it 
more keenly felt than in the pages of James Bryce￿s seminal account of nineteenth-
century American politics, the American Commonwealth.  In his several visits to the U.S. 
while preparing the book, Bryce relied on Mugwump reformers such as Godkin, Carl 
Schurz, George William Curtis, and Nation publisher Henry Villard.  Godkin￿s impact 
was especially strong.  The American Commonwealth betrays the same Darwinian-fueled 
scientific spirit and the same class and racial prejudices that defined Godkin￿s analysis.
31 
The Mugwump view was especially evident in Bryce￿s account of urban party 
politics.  Like Godkin, he eschewed expressions of moral outrage for a more careful 
analysis of the roots of municipal corruption.  Diverse cities offered ￿the best soil for 
[the] growth￿ of boss politics, he argued.  His rationale in support of that claim precisely 
followed that offered in the pages of the Nation.  Along with frequent elections, 
numerous offices, and universal suffrage, three factors fueled municipal misrule: ￿a vast 
population of ignorant immigrants,￿ the fact that the bulk of the ￿leading men￿ in each 
city were ￿intensely occupied with business,￿ and communities so large that people know 
little of one another, and that the interest of each individual in good government is 
comparatively small.￿
32   27
Bryce framed his analysis in the evolutionary terms of the day.  Machine politics 
resembled nothing so much as ancient tribal or feudal relations.  ￿The bond between the 
party chiefs and their followers is very close and very seldom broken,￿ he wrote.  ￿What 
the client was to his patron at Rome, what the vassal was to his lord in the Middle Ages, 
that the ￿heelers￿ and ￿workers￿ are to their Boss in these great transatlantic cities.￿  Just 
as Godkin placed Irish voters in the clan stage of politics, so Bryce located the ethos of 
urban party politics in the distant past.  Machines were a feudal remnant, brought to the 
U.S. by peasants from a culture that had not yet evolved sufficiently enough to generate 
independent citizens capable of functioning in a representative democracy.
33 
In this context, machine politics became the product of a separate moral realm.  It 
was not enough to condemn party politicians for rejecting or ignoring the prevailing code 
of ethics.  They were operating within a separate, distinctive moral code.  Machine 
politicians were not ￿wicked men,￿ Bryce insisted, but were better understood as ￿the 
offspring of a system￿ whose ￿morality￿ was ￿that of their surroundings.￿  Class and 
ethnic origins explained the behavior of party bosses.  ￿A city boss is often of foreign 
birth and humble origin; he has grown up in an atmosphere of oaths and cocktails; ideas 
of honour and purity are as strange to him as ideas about the nature of the currency and 
the incidence of taxation.￿  ￿Even city politicians,￿ he added, ￿must have a moral code 
and moral standard.  It is not the code of an ordinary unprofessional citizen.  It does not 
forbid falsehood, or malversation, or ballot stuffing, or ￿repeating.  But it denounces 
apathy or cowardice, disobedience, and above all treason to the party.￿   
In effect Bryce, like Godkin, argued that the United States had more than one 
political culture.  Neither observer was prepared to place the code of the machine   28
politician on equal footing with bourgeois Victorian morality.  The machine ethos was 
clearly inferior.  It stemmed from ancient feudal and clan traditions that were inadequate 
and inappropriate to a modern urban-industrial society.  But both claimed that respectable 
reformers and party politicians, along with their respective supporters, operated from 
separate ethical codes, a recognition that constituted a first, inadvertent step toward 
imagining American politics in plural terms.   
 
Elite reformers were not the only or even the primary agents of this reconception 
of American democracy.  In many respects, they were responding to the claims of 
workers, immigrants, and party politicians.  But their capacity for propagating their ideas 
was unsurpassed and their acknowledgement, however inadvertent, of the multiple, 
divergent interests active in American public life was significant.  It would remain for a 
later generation of reformers, intellectuals, politicians, and grass-roots activists to give 
equal legitimacy to the competing political cultures evident in the Gilded Age.  But the 
Mugwump￿s recognition of that diversity ultimately helped legitimate the idea of a plural 
politics upon which the ethos of machine politics rested.  
The rise of the machine metaphor did not cause this shift in American political 
thought, but it helped open the way for it.  In representing party politics in as a complex, 
powerful phenomenon with distinct class connotations, reformers helped move critiques 
of American politics away from a focus on individual dishonesty and toward social 
analysis.  The careful studies of machine politics that followed increasingly emphasized 
the group sources of municipal corruption and urban political conflict.  The result was an   29
increasing consciousness of the plural character of public life in the United States, a 
consciousness that would become commonplace in twentieth-century America. 
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